Publications

The Epistemic Authority of Practice

We often engage with epistemic authorities in order to gain access to certain kinds of epistemic goods. But philosophical accounts of such authority often fail to recognise the complexity of the non-idealised and real relationships we have with such authorities. I suggest a novel way to conceptualise individuals with epistemic authority: as agents who can provide us with access to an epistemic practice that we would otherwise, due to a lack of expertise, not have access to. I call this the epistemic authority of practice. Consideration of this sense of epistemic authority, I argue, more clearly explains how such authorities can play a diverse range of roles in our lives: as sources of true belief, providers of understanding, but also as intellectual collaborators, and educational guides. The account properly locates the source of such authority not in any individual per se, but in the social-epistemic practice that provides us with access to our desired epistemic outcomes.

In Philosophy, Expertise, and The Myth of Neutrality, edited by Farina M. & Lavazza A. (London: Routledge, 2024). A preprint copy can be found here.

‘Doctor Knows Best’: On the Epistemic Authority of the Medical Practitioner

We often consider medical practitioners as epistemic authorities on certain issues: ‘doctor knows best’, as the saying goes. The place of expert judgement in Evidence-Based Medicine hierarchies, however, and the role of patient preferences, values, and circumstances in medical decision making, pose problems for making sense of such authority. I argue that there is room for an account of such epistemic authority in medicine, one that both does justice to the complexities of the doctor-patient relationship and EBM hierarchies, while maintaining that medical practitioners hold an epistemically privileged position. I argue that such a view can better inform medical training, practice, and regulation, by clearly illuminating the distinct roles of both patient and doctor in decision-making processes. 

In Philosophy of Medicine. Can be found here.

Manuscripts Under Review

Epistemic Autonomy and Responsibility in the Face of Epistemic Authority

On some accounts of epistemic authority one ought to modify one's cognitive behaviour on the basis of an authority's epistemic stance. If an epistemic authority believes that p, for example, then I ought to believe that p—even if this stands opposed by my prior reasons for believing that p or not-p. Prima facie, this seems to run contrary to intuitions we may have about epistemic autonomy: the idea that we ought to in some sense ‘think for ourselves’. I echo others (Zagzebski (2012); Encabo (2008)) in arguing that any such difficulty can be dissolved by avoiding the temptation to identify epistemic autonomy with epistemic self-reliance. I suggest that epistemic autonomy in such cases is constituted by an agent's reflective endorsement of the relevant epistemic practice. Furthermore, I argue that to identify someone as an epistemic authority is to recognise her as being better equipped to engage in, and reap the benefits of, an epistemic practice that one endorses. Such reflective endorsement, however, cannot exhaust all requirements of epistemic responsibility: each particular instance of an epistemically authoritative relationship allows for an agent to engage with an epistemic practice to a greater or lesser degree—this paper outlines what may be required of such an agent under these different conditions. 

A draft can be found here.